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The work of Alfred North Whitehead has been undergoing something of a resurgence 
over the last decade, and Isabelle Stengers’ Thinking with Whitehead: A Free and 
Wild Creation of Concepts has played a not inconsiderable role in bringing his work 
into wider circulation. Originally written as Penser avec Whitehead: Une libre et 
sauvage création de concepts in 2002, this 2011 English translation makes Stengers’ 
account of Whitehead available for an even wider readership. In the process of this 
renewed engagement with Whitehead, the at-times latent or implicit presence of his 
thought in the work of writers of the history and philosophy of science, as well as 
science and technology studies, has also become more apparent, thereby making for a 
doubly compelling reason to revisit the importance and influence of his work. 
 
Stengers’ motivation in thinking with Whitehead is in part to go beyond standard 
philosophical designations such as nature and mind that bifurcate our thinking into 
stagnant abstractions. The revision of our modes of abstraction--Whitehead’s core 
pursuit--is then taken up by Stengers in order to consider how to develop more vivid 
abstractions. In undertaking this trajectory she moves through Whitehead’s central 
philosophical (rather than earlier mathematical) texts, including Concept of Nature 
through to Process and Reality and Modes of Thought. While on the one hand this 
approach could be seen as a genealogical tracing from early work to more developed 
later work, this is far from a linear account of Whitehead’s work, since there is always 
an anticipatory way in which the move beyond the bifurcation of nature in Concept of 
Nature, for instance, will turn up again as a transformed approach to perceptive 
experience in Process and Reality. Concepts are at once anticipatory and revisited, 
addressing questions that may have been left open or not realized until later work 
made them apparent. And as we find out when it comes to reading Whitehead (as well 
as Stengers), the circling round of ideas means it may also be helpful to navigate these 
texts with an index,1 since ideas are not staked out in advance and demonstrated in a 
clear progression, but rather are worked through and transformed through the very 
process of writing about them. These are both authors in the process of becoming with 
ideas. 
 
For Whitehead and Stengers, revisiting speculation--and metaphysics--is a way to 
develop ideas that had been banished from modern philosophy, and to attempt to take 
a leap from “the solid ground of our self-evidence”2 in order to account for “every 
element of our experience.”3 In moving beyond an approach to philosophy that might 
judge, denounce or criticize on the basis of an assumed solid ground, Stengers qua 
Whitehead considers the contours of a philosophical project that might open up and 
transform ideas, and so shift away from a modern project of closing down in order to 
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make pronouncements of knowledge, fact, truth and the other usual suspects of 
logical thought that Stengers seeks to rethink. There are many critical aspects of 
Whitehead’s work that Stengers works through in order to advance this approach to 
speculative philosophy--many more than could be addressed here. But among the 
central concepts is the notion of revising subjects and objects--or in other words, 
inverting Kant--so that “subjective data” is not a process of translating into “the 
appearance of the objective world”; but rather through Whitehead’s notion of the 
“philosophy of the organism,” an account might be developed that addresses “how 
objective data pass into subjective satisfaction.” Rather than abandoning subject and 
object, these terms are reversed, and the subject becomes a “superject,” emerging 
from the world, and constituted through feeling. An object, by extension, is a 
“’component in feeling.’”4 
 
Within this trajectory of speculative philosophy, subjects and objects as well as 
experience, perception and empiricism are recast to describe not fixed categories or 
entities that may individually interact, but rather potentialities and actualities that are 
in process, undergoing realization, and differently inherited. Kant, as well as Hume 
and Descartes are reworked, so that bodies, for instance, are seen not to belong to 
fixed subjects, but rather selves proceed as actual entities in the making “’from my 
possession of the world.’”5 The prehension of actual entities is then a way of 
articulating ways of being “’for a world,’” and not “’of a world.’”6 So too might 
categories constitute a world, rather than “a reality independent of the process that 
produces this proposition.” Lest readers see this as a simple rehashing of old versions 
of constructivism, however, a reality is articulated instead through “the proposition 
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and its effect.”7 Here, ways of being for worlds become apparent as having direct 
relevance for research engaged with history and philosophy of science or science and 
technology studies that might deal with the “fact” of an electron, or the modes of 
capture performed through measurement. But also, the relevance of speculative 
philosophy is underscored in the ways in which it enables encounters with the 
transformation and making of experience, rather than a project searching after fixed 
definitions or a priori truths--or their deconstruction. 
 
An important and persistent part of Stengers’ thinking with Whitehead is working 
through Whitehead’s concept of God, which is the spinning axis of his metaphysical 
system. Stengers notes that God is a figure within Whitehead’s work that causes many 
readers to turn away or dismiss him, so she is especially careful to draw out what is 
actually provocative and productive about this unusual God. She notes that Whitehead 
was distinctly opposed to a monotheistic or dogmatic God that provided ultimate 
justification for judgments, and that he saw this approach to religion as the 
diminishment of understanding capacities of divine functioning.8 God is not the 
“supreme author of the play,” but rather is a principle of limitation and concretion that 
attests to intensification and solidarity. This is what makes a speculative adventure 
“cosmological,” rather than a “free-for-all.”9 The “function” of God is then to affirm 
the ways in which entities are “’for the world’ as the conditions and creature of 
creativity.”10 It is within this endurance of worlds, as well as potential for creative 
advance, that the project of speculative philosophy unfolds.   
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In this way, Stengers draws out the contribution that Whitehead’s speculative 
philosophy makes not just to overcoming the bifurcation of mind and nature, but also 
by mobilizing the speculative project as an adventure of ideas. Speculation may not 
provide a normative script against which criticism, judgment, or an appeal to logical 
empirical fact can make their claims, but it instead asks the critical question of what is 
required in order to have a foothold in any particular way, or in other words: “’from 
what wager does your success proceed?’” These are “polite questions that one 
creature may address to another creature”11 that do not make the point of tearing 
down ideas and accomplishments in order to query them, but instead ask what has 
been committed to make these adherences hold, what might the consequences of these 
commitments be, and what other capabilities remain as-of-yet unexplored?  
 
Although not discussed explicitly for the first 514 pages of her text, Stengers develops 
a notion of ethics within her final concluding discussion of Whitehead to consider 
“what designates the field of speculative ambition.” Ethics here is distinct from usual 
approaches to morality and instead gains traction through its connection to ethos--
where Whiteheadian habits, aesthetics and presence describe an approach to ethics 
that take into account how “a social identity” might “accept, or does not accept, the 
test constituted by the encounter with other, divergent identities.”12 Rather than ethics 
in search of awakening, this is an ethics constituted through infection, or through a 
persuasion that might transform the dreams and ideas of others.13 And while ethics 
appears in a rather cursory way at the end of this study, its implicit pairing with ethos 
is present in multiple discussions, not least of which is in relation to etho-ecology and 
the ways in which organisms take their environments into account. The endurance of 
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an organism in an environment has less to do with the conquering of its habitat, and 
more to do with the “patience” of the environment that enables an organism to endure 
in this particular way. Patience, as it turns out, may shift to impatience, and an 
impatient environment is one that may no longer ensure the endurance of particular 
organisms. This is another way of recasting what might be seen as environmental 
ethics, while also describing how values and attainments take hold, endure and 
transform, not simply as the exertion of an agent of free will acting on its environment, 
or even as an environment deterministically encoding what inhabitations are possible, 
but rather as the realization of modes of togetherness that may perish. 
 
In taking up the revisions that Whitehead’s work poses, Stengers does much more 
than sketch out a history of ideas or summary of concepts, but instead undertakes a 
distinct approach of thinking with Whitehead. This is a strategy that involves a thinker 
thinking through what another has thought, while also being thought through the 
(re)construction of these ideas, which have consequences and that work back on the 
writer-reader. Stengers has then sought out and created a circumstance in which to be 
rethought, or to become a “gear” within a Whiteheadian philosophical system.14 This 
approach is more than a passing literary style, moreover, since how a writer-reader 
might take up and so transform ideas is at the core of how Stengers understands 
Whitehead’s project of speculative philosophy. By reading texts, philosophers 
transform them, mutate and make something new from them. This is an example of an 
adventure, a “free and wild creation of concepts” that demonstrates what thinking with 
entails. Stengers’ engagement with Whitehead’s ideas works through speculative 
philosophy while moving across physics, biology, religion, art, academic knowledge 
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politics and ecological inhabitations. In these encounters, she revisits the formulation 
of problems to consider how these might be issues not of what we know, but of how 
the process of encountering problems puts worlds in motion. The relevance of 
recasting our modes of abstraction then becomes apparent in multiple registers, since 
as Whitehead has noted, “As we think, we live.”15 
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